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MINERAL RIGHTS
Patrick H. Martin*
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
LEAP Eligibility Dates
Act 613 of the 1988 Regular Session amends and reenacts Louisiana
Revised Statutes 30:148.2(1)(b) and 47:648.1(1)(b) relative to the Louis-
iana Economic Acceleration Program (LEAP), changing the eligibility
date for wells certified under the LEAP program.
LEAP and School Board Leases
Act 514 amends and reenacts Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:152 and
enacts Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:648.5 relative to mineral leases of
school boards. It provides that the provisions of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:148.1 through 148.7 and Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:648.1
(LEAP) shall not authorize the breach of any term or condition of any
state agency lease applying to lands or mineral interest owned or ad-
ministered by any school board.
Consent of Co-Owners
Act 647 revises articles 164, 166, and 175 of the Mineral Code,
which relate to the requirement of consent from co-owners of mineral
servitudes or co-owners of land for an exercise of the right to produce
minerals. The revisions preserve the principle in the Mineral Code that
one co-owner may not conduct operations without the consent of his
co-owner. However, this principle is limited so that a small minority
cannot frustrate the desires of the majority of owners of rights in land
and minerals. Act 1047 of the 1986 Regular Session had revised these
articles to allow exercise of the right to produce where consent of ninety
percent of the co-owners was obtained. The 1988 revision reduces that
consent requirement to eighty percent. As before, a co-owner of land
or a mineral servitude who does not consent to development has no
liability for the costs of development and operations except out of his
share of production.
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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Offshore Production Agreements Authorized
Act 651 enacts Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:10.1, which authorizes
the Governor or his designee to enter into an Offshore Production
Agreement with the United States setting out the procedures for joint
conservation practices concerning minerals in common hydrocarbon bear-
ing areas that underlie the federal and state boundary offshore. The
Commissioner of Conservation is designated to hold a hearing on such
an agreement in specified circumstances and make a recommendation
to the Governor. After final agreement between the state and the United
States (or by decision of an arbitrator or a court), the Commissioner
shall, if directed by the Governor, issue an order ratifying the agreement
or decision. The Act also amends and reenacts the introductory paragraph
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:21 relating to fees charged by the
Office of Conservation, allowing revision of such fees after review by
the Commissioner of Conservation.
Payments Under State Leases
Act 963 of the 1988 Regular Session amends and reenacts section
136 A of title 30 to require that mineral leases granted by or for the
state include provisions for the timely payment of all sums due the state
and to provide for disposition of funds received under leases.
STATE AND FEDERAL LANDS
No Duty for Secretary of the Interior to Unitize Federal Lands with
State Lands
The case of State of Louisiana v. United States' held that the
Secretary of the Interior is under no duty to enter a unitization ar-
rangement with the state for a reservoir that is partially on state and
partially on federal lease lands. The actions of the federal lessee in this
case were not shown to violate correlative rights of the state lessee.
Under the Submerged Lands Act2 (SLA) and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),3 the State of Louisiana has the power to
lease and develop the seabed out to three miles from its coast on the
Gulf of Mexico, and the United States has the authority to lease and
develop the area called the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), which lies
seaward of that state area. Some oil and gas reservoirs lie across the
respective lines of jurisdiction and thus may be subject to development
1. 832 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1592 (1988).
2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-56 (1982).
3. Id. §§ 1331-56.
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by state lessees in one portion and by federal lessees in the seaward
portion of the reservoir. The State of Louisiana and its lessees here
brought suit against the United States and its lessee for relief based on
a claim that the federal lessee was causing waste with respect to a
reservoir subject to the jurisdiction of both the state and federal gov-
ernments, and a claim that these actions were violating the correlative
rights of the state and its lessees. The state sought a limitation of
production by the federal lessee to its proportionate share of the hy-
drocarbons of the reservoir and a court order requiring unitization of
the reservoir. The claim rested on three grounds, section 8(g) of the
OCSLA,4 an established policy between the government agency respon-
sible for management of the OCS oil and gas (the U.S. Geological
Survey, which was succeeded by the Minerals Management Service), and
the correlative rights of the state and its lessees under federal law. The
United States and its lessee sought dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants,5 hold-
ing that Section 8(g) provides for a sharing of revenues (27076 to the
state) from the federal OCS leases in a specified zone that incorporates
drainage compensation to the state, and that the state remedy for re-
source drainage is limited to the section 8(g)(2) revenue sharing. The
asserted policy of the government agency was never published as a
rulemaking in the Federal Register and could not be binding upon the
federal lessee. The doctrine of correlative rights, as reflected in the rules
promulgated under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,6 extends only
to waste of oil or gas. Since the plaintiffs made no showing that the
federal lessee's operations denied the state's lessees an equal opportunity
to produce hydrocarbons from their leasehold, the evidence on waste
was insufficient to create a genuine factual issue; thus summary judgment
was appropriate.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision. The court held that the Secretary of the Interior has no duty
to unitize under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,7 though he
may enter into such an arrangement in his discretion. An alleged policy
agreement between the state and the federal government did not create
legally enforceable rights. There was no evidence that defendant Samedan
engaged in wasteful practices.
Royalty Valuation-Jurisdiction
Where a federal lessee sought a declaratory judgment and remand
of its case to the Interior Department for proper calculation of royalty
4. Id. § 1337(g)(2).
5. Louisiana v. United States, 656 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. La. 1986).
6. 30 C.F.R. § 250.2(i), (qq) (1982).
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(3).
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based on value of gas sold, the Fifth Circuit in Amoco Production Co.
v. Hodell held that the primary objective of the complaining party was
to obtain money from the federal government in an amount greater that
$10,000. The claim thus was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States Claims Court.
Plaintiff Amoco in this case brought an action for declaratory
judgment that it had properly paid royalties to its lessor, the Department
of the Interior. The gas in question was being sold to Florida Power
and Light under a warranty contract (no particular reserves of gas were
dedicated to it) entered into in 1965. The lease between Amoco and the
United States had begun in 1974. Plaintiff contended that the gas was
limited in price under Section 105 of the Natural Gas Policy Act 9 and
that it could not be required under the lease to pay royalty at a higher
value than the maximum lawful price for the gas. The defendant United
States filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
asserting that Amoco's claim was a disguised claim for money damages
and that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the Claims Court under the Tucker
Act. 10
The federal district court granted summary judgment for defendants
on the merits," holding that although plaintiff was correct in asserting
that section 105 acted to limit the price of gas "sold under" a contract
even though it was not "subject to" the contract in the sense of the
reserves being dedicated, the value of the gas for purposes of the royalty
clause and a valuation determination by the government could still be
higher than the maximum lawful price. The lessee here could have s6ld
the gas at a higher price had it elected to do so on the effective date
of the NGPA controls.
Amoco appealed and the United States again raised the subject
matter jurisdiction issue. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded to
the federal district court to transfer the case to the Claims Court pursuant
to the Tucker Act. Jurisdiction over the claim of Amoco was vested
exclusively in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act as the action was:
1) against the United States; 2) founded on the Constitution, federal
statute, executive regulation or government contract; and 3) the action
sought monetary relief in excess of $10,000. It is the last of these
elements that made this a close case, for Amoco sought declaratory
relief, a remand to the Interior Department for proper calculation of
royalty, and a permanent injunction against application of the Interior
Department's administrative decision upholding the valuation, but did
8. 815 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 3315 (1982).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. 1988).
11. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hodel, 627 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. La. 1986).
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not expressly ask for monetary relief. But the court ruled that the real
effort or primary objective of the complaining party was to obtain
money from the federal government.
From the reported case it appears that the conduct of the lessee
may significantly affect the jurisdiction of a court to hear the essential
claims in a controversy with the United States as lessor. The Fifth
Circuit's characterization of Amoco's claim as seeking monetary relief
is based on the fact that Amoco had already paid some royalty to the
United States above that which Amoco claimed it actually owed. Had
Amoco sought precisely the relief it did but not made payments on the
basis of the government's valuation, it does not appear that the Tucker
Act would have applied.
TAKE OR PAY LITIGATION
Force Majeure, Commercial Impracticability, Imprevision, Mistake
and Error, and Failure of Cause or Consideration.
Hanover Petroleum brought suit against defendant Tenneco for breach
of a gas purchase contract in Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco,
Inc. 2 In the spring of 1983, Tenneco had adopted its Emergency Gas
Purchase Policy, under which it repudiated the terms of its contracts
with numerous natural gas producers around the country. Hanover was
one of the many producers who filed suit for specific performance,
seeking to invalidate the Emergency Gas Purchase Policy and to enforce
the quantity, pricing, and take provisions of the contract. Tenneco raised
defenses of force majeure, commercial impracticability, imprevision, mis-
take and error, and failure of cause or consideration. The trial court
granted summary judgment for plaintiff in striking these affirmative
defenses. The court of appeals affirmed.
The law of Louisiana was held to apply to the contract. Although
the contract was signed in Texas and the parties were not residents of
Louisiana, the contract was to be performed in Louisiana, and the
immovable property affected by the contract was in Louisiana. The
claim of force majeure under the force majeure of the contract was
based on an economic recession, the pricing scheme of the Natural Gas
Policy Act, the abundance of and the drop in the price of competitive
fuels, the mild 1982-1983 winter, the increase in deliverability of fields
committed to Tenneco under gas purchase contracts, and the delivery
by producers of greater quantities of higher cost gas under contracts
that involved the sale of gas in more than one price category.
12. 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 800 (1988).
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Although circumstances relied on by the defendant were beyond its
control, adverse economic conditions and modifications in governmental
regulations that tend to render performance burdensome and unprofitable
were held not to constitute force majeure. The common law doctrine
of commercial impracticability, held the court, has no application under
Louisiana law.t" The doctrine of imprevision, 4 a French doctrine that
permits judicial reformation of contracts whenever a drastic change in
circumstances renders performance for one of the parties harsh, was
rejected for the same reason as commercial impracticability. The claim
of error was founded on nothing more than an error in judgment on
the part of the defendant based on its own evaluation of future market
conditions. The court stated that it was not within the province of the
courts to relieve parties of their bad bargains. The principal cause of
the gas purchase contract was the sale and purchase of a fixed volume
of natural gas at a fixed price; there was no error about these. The
expectation of profit is irrelevant to a determination of error. The court
also rejected the claim that the consideration for the obligation to pay
for gas not taken was the ability to make up the gas at a later time
and that since make up was not possible there was no cause or con-
sideration for the take-or-pay obligation. Nor was the take or pay
obligation an unlawful stipulated damage clause; instead, it was an
alternative obligation.15 Take-or-pay obligations are commonplace in the
natural gas industry and are not unconscionable or unfair, noted the
court. The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of
the quantum of damages and the availability of specific performance.
The reported case is a rather definitive rejection of the principal
defenses to claims of breach of take-or-pay obligations in gas purchase
contracts relied on by pipelines. The fact that this appeal was on a
summary judgment and that the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs
would suggest that there is little to litigate in such take-or-pay disputes.
Irreparable Damage and Minimum Take Provision
Plaintiff Pogo Producing Company, a natural gas producer who
sold gas to defendant United, brought a claim for breach of six gas
purchase contracts. Pogo sought a preliminary injunction requiring United
to take and to pay for certain minimum quantities of gas under the
contracts. The plaintiff asserted that it would sustain irreparable damage
if the defendant were not required to take the gas pending resolution
13. See Superior Oil Co. v. Transco Energy Co., 616 F. Supp. 98 (W.D. La. 1985).
14. See Litvinoff, Force Majeure, Failure of Cause, and Theorie De L'Imprevision:
Louisiana Law and Beyond, 46 La. L. Rev. 1, 15-17 (1985).
15. See Pogo Producing Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 493 So. 2d 909 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writ denied, 497 So. 2d 310 (1986).
[Vol. 49
MINERAL RIGHTS
of the suit for specific performance of the contracts. A Commissioner
of the Civil District Court found no irreparable harm, and the district
judge then denied the preliminary injunction. The court of appeal af-
firmed and remanded in Pogo Producing Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line
Co. 16
The appeal focused on the expert testimony regarding the twenty-
one reservoirs covered by the contracts at issue. The Commissioner and
trial court accepted the position of the defendant's witnesses that while
there might be some irreparable loss of gas, the amounts could be
calculated and the plaintiff compensated through money damages. The
findings were not clearly erroneous and thus were upheld by the appeals
court. The court pointed out that the absence of irreparable injury was
no bar to specific performance. 7 On remand the trial court could still
grant specific performance as a remedy.
Jurisdiction Over Take-or-Pay Claims on the OCS
The case of Amoco Production Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co. 18
involved an interlocutory appeal to ascertain the jurisdiction of the
federal courts under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 19 for take-
or-pay litigation. Sea Robin reduced its purchases under contracts claim-
ing force majeure. The reduced takes were sometimes below the take-
or-pay quantity required, with no payment being made, and sometimes
below the contract's minimum take obligations. Amoco brought suit in
state court, and Sea Robin removed to federal court, asserting that
federal question jurisdiction existed under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act. Amoco sought remand of the case to state court, but the
district court ruled it had jurisdiction. The district court certified the
jurisdictional question to the Fifth Circuit, which held that the federal
courts do have jurisdiction in such cases. The court ruled:
Any dispute that alters the progress of production activities on
the OCS threatens to impair the total recovery of the federally-
owned minerals from the reservoir or reservoirs underlying the
OCS. Such a dispute was intended by Congress to be within
the grant of federal jurisdiction contained in § 1349.
Exercise of take-or-pay rights, minimum-take rights, or both,
by Sea Robin necessarily and physically has an immediate bearing
16. 511 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
17. See J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Northgate Mall, Inc., 404 So. 2d 896 (La. 1981);
Superior Oil, 616 F. Supp. 98.
18. 844 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1988).
19. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (1982). In footnote 19, 844 F.2d 1202, 1206-07, the court
goes over the reported and unreported cases that have split on the question of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts under the OCSLA over take-or-pay litigation issues.
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on the production of the particular well, certainly in the sense
of the volume of gas actually produced. Dispute by the parties
of their respective rights, duties, defenses, and obligations is
thus a controversy arising out of, or in connection with (A)
any operation . . . which involves exploration, development, or
production of the minerals ... § 1349(b)(1). 20
The court thus gave an expansive reading to the federal court jurisdiction
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
It should be pointed out that the federal court will have to apply
state contract law in most circumstances to the controversies in take-
or-pay litigation. 2' As suggested in the discussion above on Hanover
Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc. ,22 the state precedents have been
generally unfavorable to pipelines on the standard take-or-pay defenses.
However, the availability of a federal forum for take-or-pay litigation
relating to the lands of the OCS may allow some differing rulings on
procedural aspects of such litigation and for substantive law matters not
yet finally ruled upon by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
OTHER CONTRACT AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Option Agreement
Otter Oil Company entered into a Geophysical Option Agreement
with Crosby Chemicals under which Otter obtained a license to conduct
surveys for minerals on 42,000 acres of land owned by Crosby. The
agreement included an option for Otter to obtain a lease on all or a
portion of the 42,000 acres for a 270-day period, provided that if Otter
were to lease, it had to lease at least 10,000 acres. At about the same
time, a Letter Agreement was entered into between Exxon and Otter
under which Otter assigned the option to lease to Exxon. The Letter
Agreement provided for Otter to receive bonus, delay rental, and over-
riding royalty from a lease to Exxon under the option. This Letter
Agreement also contained an extension-and-renewal clause, 23 which pro-
vided that if Exxon acquired a mineral lease on all or a part of the
42,000 acres within a year after the expiration of the 270-day period
of the option, then Otter would be entitled to the same payments it
would have received had the option been exercised. Exxon did not
exercise the option as assigned but did take a lease on 4,387 acres out
of 42,000 acres to which the option had applied within a year after the
20. 844 F.2d at 1210.
21. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). The state law that is applied is properly referred to
as surrogate federal law.
22. 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 800 (1988).
23. This type of clause is often referred to as an "anti-washout" provision.
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expiration of the option. Exxon paid to Otter overriding royalty out of
this lease, but declined to pay bonus and delay rental. Otter claimed
that the clause required Exxon to pay a bonus of $30 per acre on all
acreage leased, with a minimum of 10,000 acres to be leased; delay
rentals of $5 per acre on all acreage leased, with a minimum of 10,000
acres to be leased; and a two percent of 8/8 overriding royalty on all
acreage selected, with a minimum of 10,000 acres to be selected and
leased. Exxon contended that under the contract the 10,000 acre min-
imum did not apply to the extension-and-renewal clause and the obli-
gation to pay bonus and rental did not apply when fewer than 10,000
acres were leased.
The Fifth Circuit in Otter Oil Co. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A. 24 reversed
a district court judgment for Exxon that had followed Exxon's inter-
pretation of the contract. The extension-and-renewal clause provided that
if Exxon acquired a mineral lease on all or part of the 42,000 acres
within one year after the expiration of the option, then the obligations,
duties, and rights set forth "herein" shall apply. The district court held
that "herein" referred only to the Letter Agreement, which did not
contain a reference to the 10,000 acre minimum. The Fifth Circuit held
that the obligations of the Geophysical Option Agreement between Otter
and Crosby Chemicals were carried over to the Letter Agreement between
Exxon and Otter. The purpose of the extension-and-renewal clause was
to prevent a washout. Its purpose was to put Otter in as good a position
as Otter would have been had Exxon not chosen to deal directly with
Crosby within one year. Thus the 10,000 acre minimum was held to
apply to achieve this purpose. The Letter Agreement incorporated by
reference the Geophysical Option Agreement, and that incorporation
included within its scope the 10,000 acre minimum specified in the
Geophysical Option Agreement. The court remanded to the district court
for proper determination and award of damages.
Prescription-Failure to Bring Claim for Breach of Contract for
Oilfield Canal Servitudes within Ten Years of Breach
A claim for a breach of contract for oilfield canal servitudes by
exceeding allowed width of such canals had prescribed, held the court
in Lewis v. Sohio Petroleum Co.,25 where the plaintiffs failed to bring
the claim within ten years of when they or their predecessors in title
knew or should have known of breach. The landowners claimed that
the defendant owners of oilfield canal servitudes had breached their
servitude contracts entered into in 1950 by exceeding width limitation
24. 834 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1987).
25. 528 So. 2d 1084 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
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for canals. The allowed width under the contracts was 65 feet, but the
defendant had exceeded this by four feet in 1953 and by thirty feet as
early as 1957. The court held the plaintiffs' predecessor knew or should
have known of the breach by 1957, thus the claim had prescribed under
the ten year liberative prescription applicable to contract claims.
26
Letter Agreements Guaranteeing Well Costs of Non-operators under
Joint Venture Operating Agreement: Exception of Prematurity
Terra Resources (Terra) brought suit against Federated Energy Cor-
poration (Federated) when Federated failed to pay the costs of two
defaulting non-operators in two wells pursuant to two letter agreements
between Terra and Federated. The agreements provided that Federated
would stand liable for the well costs of the two, stating that "all invoices
which may become delinquent for a period more than 60 days from
the invoice date thereof, shall become the responsibility of FEC to pay
." A later addendum provided that "Terra will use all legal means
at its disposal to collect all monies due [from the two others] so that
FEC's liability under this agreement will be minimized." The two others
failed to pay, so Terra sent invoices to Federated, which paid $499,199.98
on behalf of the two others and then refused to make further payments.
Federated, in response to Terra's suit, filed an exception of prematurity
on the ground that the agreement required Terra to exhaust all litigation
against the two others before it could recover from Federated. This
exception was maintained by the trial court but on appeal the appellate
court reversed and remanded, 27 saying the addendum referencing use of
"all legal means" did not state that Federated had no obligation to pay
pending use of all legal means. Because of the ambivalence or ambiguity
of the addendum, the case was remanded for the trial court to inquire
into the circumstances showing the parties' intentions.
On remand, the trial court again maintained Federated's exception
of prematurity because of a conflict between a provision of the letter
agreements and the addendum and because it found the addendum
contemplated an uncollectible judgment by Terra before Federated had
to act as surety. At trial the defendant offered the addendum in evidence
and rested. Plaintiff Terra appealed the trial court judgment for defen-
dant. The Court of Appeal reversed, 28 holding the trial court ruling that
the evidence was sufficient to support the exception of prematurity was
in conflict with the prior appellate decision. The Louisiana Supreme
Court vacated and remanded to the Court of Appeal for a review of
26. La. Civ. Code art. 3499 (1984).
27. Terra Resources v. Federated Energy Comm'n, 465 So. 2d 127 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 468 So. 2d 1212 (1985).
28. 504 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
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the entire record, including the correctness of the trial court's factual
findings regarding the parties' intent as revealed by the testimony of
the witnesses. 29
On further remand, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court granting of the exception of prematurity in Terra
Resources v. Federated Energy Corp.3" The trial court's factual deter-
mination that the addendum was a modification of the letter agreement
and that "all legal means" contemplated that Terra had to have an
uncollectible judgment before collecting from Federated was not man-
ifestly erroneous.
CONVEYANCING
Rescission of Royalty Deed for Fraud
In El Paso Exploration Co. v. Olinde3' a royalty deed was declared
a nullity where it was secured by fraud. The grantee misled a mother
to induce her children to sign a royalty deed to property that they were
not aware they owned.
El Paso provoked a concursus as well operator to determine own-
ership of rights to production proceeds. Consolidated with this was a
proceeding to rescind a royalty deed to 23 acres that Bergeron and
Olinde brought against the Hamners. The appellate court upheld a trial
court judgment declaring the royalty deed in question a nullity, having
been obtained by fraud. The grantee had obtained a royalty interest
purportedly from the mother of plaintiffs, but the grantee also had
secured the signatures of the plaintiffs, with the grantee knowing that
the mother was only a usufructuary of land who could not grant the
royalty. 32 The grantee knew the children could convey the royalty and
concealed this. Thus their consent to the deed was vitiated by error.
Disguised Usufruct
The case of Lyons v. Fisher" can be best understood by providing
a chronology of events and raising the pertinent issues at the time the
event in question is noted.
On May 7, 1968, A (the mother, Julie Fisher) donated Blackacre
to B and C (son and daughter of A, Franklin and Hazel Fisher re-
spectively), reserving a mineral servitude. The next day, B and C con-
veyed to A the usufruct of Blackacre (also referred to below as the
29. 508 So. 2d 79 (La. 1987).
30. 513 So. 2d 367 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 514 So. 2d 1181 (1987).
31. 527 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
32. See La. Min. Code at La. R.S. 31:195 (1975).
33. 847 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1988).
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Northwest Quarter). What was the effect of this transaction? Was it a
disguised reservation of a usufruct prohibited by Article 1533 of the
Civil Code? 4
In 1972, C conveyed her interest in Blackacre to B, reserving a
mineral servitude. If C owned nothing at this time, what was the effect
of this transaction?
In 1975, A died, leaving B and C as her heirs. What is the effect
of C's inheritance of rights in Blackacre on C's 1972 conveyance? Could
the after-acquired title doctrine operate to vest title in the land to B
and create in C a mineral servitude?
In 1980, C died. In 1982, C's heirs and B leased Blackacre to Hunt
Oil. In 1985, B and Hunt entered into an amendment of the 1982 lease
to recognize B as sole owner of the minerals of Blackacre. C's heirs
thereupon commenced an action seeking a declaratory judgment rec-
ognizing their ownership of one-half interest in minerals in Blackacre.
The suit was removed to federal court, and the district court gave
judgment to B. On appeal by the plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit reversed.
The reasoning for the Fifth Circuit's decision was as follows. A's
1968 conveyance to B and C was a nullity because the grant was a
disguised reservation of a usufruct. C owned nothing in 1972 when she
conveyed to B with a reservation of mineral rights, but the court
characterized this as "an agreement to create a mineral servitude in the
future" 35 rather than a prohibited reservation of an expectancy in the
extinction of an outstanding mineral servitude.16 It was dependent on
C's future ownership of the property. The court held that C created a
mineral servitude through the after-acquired title doctrine of article 726
of the Louisiana Civil Code. Stated the court:
This mineral reservation did not violate the public policy stated
in Hicks where a previous landowner claimed an outstanding
mineral servitude when it prescribed. Here the servitude's cre-
ation was dependent on Hazel's [C's] inheritance. The Northwest
Quarter was not burdened with a servitude until 1975. The
defendant is also estopped to deny the after acquired title doc-
trine's operation regarding the mineral servitude, because the
34. This article was amended in 1974 to allow the reservation of a usufruct, but this
amendment was to be given only prospective application.
35. 847 F.2d at 1161. The court held that the cases of Ober v. Williams, 213 La.
568, 35 So. 2d 219 (1948) and Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Ayer Timber Co., 131
So. 2d 635 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) were applicable to the facts of this case. In those
two cases landowners executed contracts to sell land in the future, which would be subject
to a reservation of mineral rights. When the options were exercised, the mineral servitudes
were held to come into existence.
36. See La. R.S. 31:76 (1975); Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
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defendant accepts the benefit of its operation, that is, title to
Hazel Fisher's inherited interest in the Northwest Quarter.37
Normally the operation of the after acquired title doctrine cannot
operate to vest title in the party against whom the doctrine is being
asserted. 8 The Fifth Circuit held that the defendant was estopped to
deny this rule because he was getting the benefit of the application of
the after-acquired title doctrine with respect to the land. This appears
to be a rather unorthodox application of equitable estoppel. The Fifth
Circuit opinion also appears to be a questionable approach to Louisiana
public policy regarding reversion of reversionary rights in minerals as
reflected in the next decision for discussion.
Mineral Servitudes: Indirect Reservation of Reversionary Rights in
Minerals Not Permitted
Where land that is subject to an outstanding mineral servitude is
sold to a buyer and the buyer thereupon conveys minerals back to seller,
the latter sale will be ineffective as a disguised reservation of reversionary
rights in minerals, which is not permitted under the Louisiana Mineral
Code. This was the holding in Rodgers v. CNG Producing Co.39
The plaintiffs, the Rodgers and their lessee, sued defendants, seeking
recognition that the plaintiffs were the owners of mineral rights on
property and were entitled to damages for trespass by defendants. The
Rodgers bought five noncontiguous tracts of land (totalling 1580 acres)
in 1975 from the Thompsons, subject to a mineral servitude reserved
by a prior landowner in 1968. The same day the Rodgers conveyed all
the minerals to the Thompsons without warranty of title. In 1978, the
mineral servitudes on the land prescribed from nonuse, and the Thomp-
sons executed leases to defendants. The court held, and the appellate
court affirmed, that the sale of minerals from the Rodgers to the
Thompsons was void as an indirect reservation of a reversionary interest
in the minerals, which violated article 76 of the Mineral Code. ° Article
7741 did not apply, for that article concerns oversales, and the transaction
here was not a warranty sale to which the after-acquired title doctrine
would apply.
The principal case concerns one of the more troublesome parts of
the Mineral Code, the provisions dealing with reversionary interests. As
the majority opinion brings out, the Mineral Code's main thrust in
37. 847 F.2d at 1162.
38. See Dillon v. Morgan, 362 So. 2d 1130 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
39. 528 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
40. La. R.S. 31:76 (1975).
41. Id. § 77.
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article 76 is to follow the well-known rule of Hicks v. Clark,42 where
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a reversionary interest may not
be an article of commerce. The articles following article 76 provide
some exceptions to this general rule, the principal one being the rec-
ognition in article 77 of the equitable principle of after-acquired title
for the purpose of protecting an innocent purchaser from an oversale
of mineral rights by a landowner. The exceptions and comments were
drafted with some specificity though not with special clarity, and an
attempt to follow the operation of the exceptions through hypothetical
cases can lead to true confusion. The dissent's reading of the exceptions
and the comments to the exceptions would have the exceptions eat up
the rule. The rule of Hicks v. Clark is sound; the Mineral Code was
not intended to change the existing law; and the majority's approach
in this case, which limits the functioning of Article 77 to oversales such
that it will not permit the creation of future mineral reservations, cannot
be faulted.
Redemption of Mineral Servitude: Royalty Payments are Civil Fruits
In Fuselier v. Peschier43 the plaintiff owned an interest in land
subject to an oil and gas lease under which he was receiving royalty.
He sold the land to another, reserving a mineral servitude for all the
minerals. He then sold the mineral servitude to defendant Peschier,
reserving to himself a right of redemption for a price of $112,000 at
any time within five years. Peschier thereupon began receiving the royalty
payments from the servitude, and after his death in 1976, his estate
received the royalty payments. In 1981, the plaintiff exercised his right
of redemption. He claimed that as part of the redemption he had the
right to all royalty that had been paid from the time of the sale. The
trial court and court of appeal rejected the plaintiff's claim. Mineral
royalties are civil fruits, which the vendee in a sale with a right of
redemption is entitled to keep until the right of redemption is exercised.
Thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to an accounting and refund of
royalties made to him or his estate prior to the exercise of the re-
demption.
Pipeline Lease: Right to Sublet
The plaintiffs in Campagna v. Tenneco Oil Co." were the owners
of a tract of land and had leased the tract to defendant Tenneco for
a pipeline right-of-way in 1967. In 1983, Tenneco had sublet its rights
42. 225 La. 133, 72 So. 2d 322 (1954).
43. 525 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
44. 522 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 801 (1988).
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to the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury, without consulting the lessor-
landowners, in order that a drainage canal be dug across the property,
preventing flooding in a nearby residential area. The Parish dug the
canal and removed a part of the dirt to fill parks and neutral ground
areas. No compensation was given to the landowners (or to Tenneco)
for the rights to the Police Jury or for the dirt used. Plaintiffs brought
suit for dissolution of the lease and for damages. The trial court dis-
missed the complaint and the court of appeals affirmed.
The rights given to Tenneco by the plaintiffs included the right to
dredge canals and to sublet all or part of the premises. Tenneco was
given the unrestricted right to assign in whole or part to third parties.
Thus, Tenneco had the right to sublet to the police jury, held the court.
The rights of the police jury to a canal right-of-way were no greater
than Tenneco's, so the grant by Tenneco could not be of a permanent
servitude; it was only a sublease. As part of the right to dredge a canal,
the lessee had the implicit right to dispose of the dirt removed in the
course of an excavation. The dirt here was not a mineral within the
meaning of the lease wherein the plaintiffs had retained rights to min-
erals. A dissent argued that the taking of the soil from the property
was not a use of the property but a depletion of it that was not
authorized by the grant of lease.
Necessity of a Writing
In Bice v. Maxwell5 the plaintiff brought suit for recognition of a
royalty, an accounting and a money judgment for past due royalties
arising from a partnership agreement. Plaintiff won a default judgment.
The defendants filed for a new trial, and this was denied. Defendants
appealed, and the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed
and remanded for a new trial. The proof presented to the trial court
was inadequate to support the judgment, the appellate court held. For
a partnership to own immovable property, including mineral rights, its
articles must be in writing. The transfer of mineral rights cannot be
the subject of a verbal agreement and cannot be proved by parol
evidence. The proof of these documents was not in the record.
OIL WELL LIEN ACT
Recordation
The lien claimant who fails to record his lien within the statutory
period of Louisiana. Revised Statutes 9:4862 has one year plus the
45. 516 So. 2d 1189 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
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recordation period to file suit, held the second circuit in Hawn Tool
Co. v. Crystal Oil Co. 46 Thus, the claim of plaintiff who failed to file
suit within one year plus 180 days had prescribed.
In this case, defendant Crystal Oil (Crystal) hired Explorer Drilling
Company (EDCO) to drill two wells. EDCO in turn entered into a
contract with plaintiff Hawn Tool Company for equipment and material
used on the wells. Unable to collect from EDCO, Hawn sought to
enforce materialman's liens under the Oil, Gas, and Water Well Lien
Act. 47 The liens were filed on April 18, 1984, for equipment and materials
provided through August 23, 1982, for one well and through December
23, 1982, for the second well; the filing dates were nineteen and fifteen
months after the date the equipment was last supplied on the respective
wells. Suit was filed against Crystal on June 25, 1984, more than 22
months after the conclusion of activity on one well and one year and
184 days after the conclusion of activity on the second. The trial court
held that the privilege was lost as notice of the claim of privilege was
not timely filed.
On appeal, the court of appeal for the second circuit affirmed. The
lien claimant who fails to record his lien within the statutory period of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4862 has one year plus the recordation
period to file suit. The statutory period within which the lien was required
to be filed as of the date the services were rendered in 1982 was 90
days, but this was changed to 180 days by the time the liens were filed.
The change to 180 days was remedial in nature and did not create or
destroy rights and thus could be given retroactive effect. More than one
year and 180 days had elapsed here since the services were rendered
before suit was filed; thus the claim had prescribed.
It should be observed that the rule of the reported case relates only
to lien rights arising before the 1986 amendment to the Oil Well Lien
Act, which made recordation within the specified statutory period, 180
days, a requirement for the preservation of the privilege. One should
also note that the court rejects the approach taken in Genina Marine
Services, Inc. v. ARCO Oil & Gas Co. ,4 which held that under the Oil
Well Lien Act, suit must be filed within one year of the last day on
which services were performed.
Work Need Not be Performed at Drilling Site for Lien to Apply
St. Mary Galvanizing Corporation had galvanized numerous metal
objects for two contractors that were assembling materials to be incor-
porated into certain offshore oil drilling platforms owned by Chevron.
46. 514 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
47. La. R.S. 9:4861-67 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
48. 499 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
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Chevron paid the two contractors, but they failed to pay St. Mary. St.
Mary then sought recovery as provided under Louisiana law by filing
liens against certain Chevron properties where, it claimed, the materials
had been incorporated. St. Mary then sued Chevron to enforce these
liens. The district court granted St. Mary's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that St. Mary was a "supplier" under section 9:4861(B)
of the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act. This was upheld on appeal in
Dahlberg & Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.4 9
The fact that the work was not actually done on the drilling site
was not determinative, said the court, especially in light of the fact that
these were offshore leases. Under recent Louisiana case law, St. Mary's
performance could not be considered too "remote" despite the physical
distance from its factory to the platforms' eventual locations in the Gulf
of Mexico and the intermediary presence of contractors between St.
Mary and Chevron." The court noted that other entities who had been
held proper claimants under the statute included the owner of a crewboat
that provided transportation to workers on a pipeline construction pro-
ject,5 a caterer who furnished food, lodging, and housekeeping services
on pipeline construction,5 2 and a claimant who supplied divers to work
on an offshore oil pipeline project."
St. Mary showed through affidavits and invoices that the pieces of
steel it had galvanized were identified with particular drilling platforms
that were destined for specific Chevron leases on the outer continental
shelf in the Gulf of Mexico. This showing effectively shifted the burden
to Chevron to show that the galvanized pieces were not actually used
in the construction of drilling platforms destined for the Chevron leases.
Although there were no cases discussing such a shifting of the burden
of proof in the context of a lien under the Oil Well Lien Act, the
analysis was said to be consistent with the legislative purposes of the
Act. The court found such public policy purpose to be "to promote
and encourage oil industry development by affording special protection
to suppliers of services and materials from damages resulting from
defaulting owners or contractors. '5 4 To hold otherwise would put a
heavy burden on service providers and materialmen. The court said they
49. 836 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1988).
50. Citing Texas Pipe and Supply Co. v. Coon Ridge Pipeline Co., 506 So. 2d 1296
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1987) and Oil Well Supply Co. v. Independent Oil Co., 219 La. 936,
54 So. 2d 330 (1951).
51. Continental Casualty Co. v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., 447 F.2d 1041, 1054-
56 (5th Cir. 1971).
52. Id.
53. Continental Casualty Co. v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., 310 F. Supp. 1207,
1226 (E.D. La. 1969).
54. 836 F.2d 915, 919 n.5.
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would have to send employees out to offshore drilling platforms to
participate in incorporating or using the materials, supplies, services,
and other such inputs on a particular platform. Also, service providers
and materialmen would need to arrange to have their employees present
at the contractor's onshore construction yard to establish the link to
the offshore lease. The Act did not require a plaintiff to probve that its
materials or supplies were actually incorporated into or became part of
the completed well or wells."
LEASE MAINTENANCE
Cancellation in Primary Term for Cessation of Operations
A provision of a sublease defining operations was held in Amoco
Production Co. v. Carruth6 to be a resolutory condition requiring
termination of sublease after passage of ninety days from completion
of a dry hole with no additional drilling in the last year of the sublease's
primary term. Inclusion of acreage in a producing unit could not revive
a sublease which had terminated.
In this case Amoco provoked a concursus proceeding to determine
the ownership of interest in minerals. Sublessor Leblanc sought cancel-
lation of a sublease to sublessee Exxon in the proceeding on a claim
that the sublease had expired for failure to pay delay rental or to
develop diligently in the primary term of the sublease in accordance
with the terms of the sublease. Exxon defended on the basis that the
drilling of a well (completed as a dry hole) excused the payment of the
delay rental for the final year of the primary term, and that the sublease
produced beyond the end of the primary term after the acreage was
included in a producing unit by the Commissioner of Conservation. The
trial court ruled for Exxon. LeBlanc appealed and the Louisiana Court
of Appeal for the First Circuit reversed. Commencement of a well
excused payment of delay rentals only if the operations were conducted
with no cessation of operations for more than ninety days. After the
completion of the dry hole the sublessee failed to resume operations
within ninety days. The sublease thus terminated. Even though the
acreage was subsequently included in a producing unit before the end
of the primary term, the court held that such production could not
have the effect of reviving a lease that had already expired before the
end of the primary term.
The agreement in this case provided: "No rental payment shall be
due or paid to the Sublessor . . . if on or before the respective due
date of such payment, EXXON has commenced or caused to be com-
55. La. R.S. 9:4861(B) (1984).
56. 512 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 516 So. 2d 366 (1988).
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menced, operations on the subleased premises or land pooled therewith
for the drilling of a well and pursues such operations diligently and in
good faith in search of production." Apparently it was undisputed that
Exxon had commenced a well and pursued it to completion as a dry
hole with diligence and good faith. But the appellate court read a clause
defining "operations" to impose upon the sublessee an obligation to
commence a new well or lose the lease. Under the court's reading of
the above clause, the lessee who commences a well must find production
or continue to drill for the entire year with no cessation of production
or operations for more than ninety days. The effect of this decision is
to impose a continuous drilling obligation on the sublessee in the last
year of the primary term of his sublease unless delay rentals have been
paid in addition to the commencement of a well.
The court's reading of the clause defining "operations" is a harsh
one that ignores the purpose of the delay rental clause and ignores the
plain meaning of the words of the agreement. Payment of rental is
excused by the commencement of operations "for the drilling of a well";
it is the operations for this "a well" that must be pursued diligently
and in good faith in search of production. The definition of "operations"
elsewhere in the lease, which provides "operations must be continuous
or with no cessation of more than ninety (90) days whether on the same
or different wells," would have application for other provisions of the
lease such as a continuous drilling clause that would allow the lease to
be continued beyond the primary term. To read a definition such as
this as providing a resolutory condition leading to termination of a
producing lease is very harsh and unjustified by the facts of the case.
The court's reading of the "No rental payment shall be due .... "
clause may also be viewed as giving it the effect of a dry hole clause
requiring a resumption of operations after the completion of a well as
a dry hole.
Normally, the commencement of a well in good faith excuses the
payment of delay rental and functions as a substitute for the payment.17
The purpose of fostering development has been served when the lessee
(sublessee) has commenced and drilled to completion the initial well on
the lease. One should note that the drilling of a well is generally far
more expensive than paying delay rentals; a lessee would not drill a
well to escape or evade the payment of delay rentals. Under the reading
of the agreement by the appellate court in Carruth, the sublessee who
is drilling a well at the time delay rental payments would otherwise be
due must pay delay rental in addition to drilling. A lessee who commences
a well with a similar definition in the lease binds himself to continue
drilling with no cessation of more than ninety days even after a dry
57. H. Williams & C. Meyers, 3 Oil & Gas Law § 606.1 (1986).
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hole, up to the next time that delay rentals may be paid to defer the
drilling of a well for another year. In the last year, the effect of the
court's treatment of the agreement is to move up the end of the primary
term of the sublease by a year, for the sublessee cannot return to delay
rentals by any provision of the agreement. The requirement of continuous
operations (operations with no cessation of more than ninety days) is
just as it would be beyond the end of the primary term. Indeed, the
cases relied on by the Court of Appeal, Talley v. Lawhon5s and Woods
v. Ratliff, 9 both concerned maintenance of a lease by operations after
the end of the primary term. Neither case truly related to the case in
question since they did not involve delay rentals. 60 The decision introduces
considerable uncertainty about the effect of operations during the pri-
mary term on delay rental payments under Louisiana law.
Novation: Declared Unit
Summary judgment was held in Bares v. Stone Oil Corp.61 to be
inappropriate to determine if a novation of four leases had taken place
with the execution of four new ones, and to determine if a declared
unit was established in bad faith where there were genuine issues of
material fact that had to be resolved. The plaintiff landowners in this
case filed suit against Stone Oil and other lessees alleging that four
mineral leases executed in the 1970s had been novated and thereby
extinguished by four new mineral leases executed in January 1981 cov-
ering the same property. In the alternative they claimed that a declared
unit created by the lessees was invalid, and the leases expired for this
reason. The new leases, which were to begin on the last day of the
primary terms of the old leases, provided for a greater royalty than the
old ones. On February 4, 1981 (three days before the expiration of the
primary term of the first of the old leases) a 160 acre unit was declared
around a well under the pooling provisions of the old leases. The unit
included portions of the acreage of the old leases. Stone, which had
acquired certain rights under a farmout agreement, also tendered Pugh
clause rentals for the old lease acreage outside the declared unit. The
defendants, Stone and other lessees under the old leases, asserted that
a novation did not take place as the new leases were not to become
effective until the old ones expired, and that the unit declaration con-
tinued the old leases.
58. 150 La. 25, 90 So. 427 (1922).
59. 407 So. 2d 1375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
60. The lease in Talley had some provision for delaying the initial well by a payment
but did not seem to have a primary term in the same sense as modern leases.
61. 510 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 514 So. 2d 130 (1987).
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The trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding
that a novation took place, and even if the old leases did not terminate
by the acquisition of the new leases, the declared unit was invalid as
being established in bad faith solely for the purpose of maintaining the
old leases and to avoid the higher royalty in the new leases. Defendants
appealed. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit reversed
and remanded. There were genuine issues of material fact to be resolved,
and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. While defendants' ex-
ecutives testified that lease maintenance and avoidance of higher royalty
were factors in forming the unit, the evidence contained some support
that the unit was declared for conservation purposes. There were also
issues whether the new leases were intended to terminate the old leases.
There was also the farmout agreement under which Stone acquired
interests from the lessees under the old leases to be interpreted.
Rentals, Change of Ownership Clause
In the case of Lapeze v. Amoco Production Co.62 cancellation of
a lease was denied where the successors in interest of a lessor were not
paid shut-in rental even though the lessee was aware of death of the
lessor. The successors had not furnished the lessee with notice under
the lease clause. The court also held that parol evidence was not ad-
missible to interpret an authentic act.
In Lapeze the successors in interest to the deceased lessor sought
the cancellation of the lease for failure to pay shut-in rentals to them
rather than to the bank account of the lessor. The lessee claimed that
it had not been furnished with notice of change of ownership as required
under the lease. The plaintiffs asserted that they had been substituted
for the lessor in the lease because they had been parties to an Act of
Correction of the lease after the death of the lessor, and the lessee had
actual knowledge of the change in ownership. The district court held
for the defendant-lessee. 63 Two plaintiffs appealed, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
The change in ownership clause provided that "regardless of any
actual or constructive notice" of a change in ownership, the lessee had
to be furnished with notice of the change as required by the lease; such
notice was not furnished to the lessee by the plaintiffs. The defendant
was compelled to make the payment in conformity with the specific
provision of the lease. The district court's conclusion that the rights
were maintained by depositing the shut-in payment to the bank was
correct.
62. 842 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1988).
63. 655 F. Supp. I (M.D. La. 1987).
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The principal case is a straightforward application of the lease clause
and well-established principles of oil and gas law. The court wisely
declined in to express an opinion on other principles asserted in the
litigation.6
Payment of Royalty
In Matthews v. Sun Exploration and Production Co.,63 a father and
two children executed a lease on certain property, with the children's
interest reflecting their inheritance from their mother. The son then
conveyed his interest to his father with a counterletter to the effect that
the father was holding this interest for the convenience of the son.
Royalty from production on the property was then paid to the father
and the daughter. When the father died, the succession was opened and
the daughter was named executrix of the estate. The earlier counterletter
reflecting that the father held for the son was included in the motion
to put the children into possession, and the judgment of possession put
the brother and sister into possession of an undivided one-half interest
each in and to the property of the father. The purchaser of production
divided the father's interest equally between the children and credited
the daughter also with the interest she had acquired previously from
her mother. This meant that the daughter was getting more than had
been intended since a portion of the interest held by the father actually
had been for the son. There were subsequent assignments of the lease
and the interest of the son, with the son's interest being acquired by
the plaintiff, Matthews, and the lease by the defendant Sun. Royalties
were paid from June 1978 to May 1985 on the incorrect assumption
that the interest of the daughter was greater than that of the son.
In July 1985, the plaintiff demanded a new division order reflecting
that he owned one-half of a one-eighth royalty and requested an ac-
counting with interest of the royalty payments made to the daughter;
in the alternative he sought cancellation of the lease. The defendant
Sun requested documentation to support the assertion, and when the
plaintiff declined to provide such documentation. Sun then examined
title but did not find the counter-letter. Plaintiff thereupon filed suit.
Sun answered with an assertion of prescription and pleaded estoppel;
Sun also filed a third-party demand against the daughter for any overpaid
royalties, seeking recovery of these on a theory of unjust enrichment.
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff, awarding him double
the amount due plus a sum for attorney's fees, and ruled against Sun
on the third-party demand. The court of appeal reversed. 6
64. 842 F.2d at 136 n.6.
65. 521 So. 2d 1192 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
66. Id.
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The defendant had perpetuated an error of its predecessor. The
defendant had given a reasonable explanation of why it had not paid
royalty in response to the demand. 67 The plaintiff had become aware
of the defendant's error in the course of their correspondence but had
refused to divulge information that would have made the defendant
aware of the error and that could have resolved the matter without
litigation. Instead the plaintiff had filed suit. The defendant throughout
acted in good faith; the assessment of penalties and attorney's fees was
unjustified. As to the defendant's plea of prescription of three years
for nonpayment of rent, 68 the court said that the doctrine of "contra
non valentum" did not apply to the claim of the plaintiff. That is,
there was no act committed by the defendant that prevented the plaintiff
from availing himself of his cause of action, and there was nothing to
indicate that the plaintiff's cause of action could not have been dis-
covered by him through the exercise of reasonable diligence. The de-
fendant's error was the result of erroneous title information, the kind
of information that was readily available to the plaintiff. Equity, justice,
and the circumstances of the case did not justify a deviation from the
ordinary prescriptive rule.
The third-party demand of the defendant should not have been
dismissed by the trial court. The defendant's actions were reasonable
error. The daughter was privy to the counterletters in question at all
times. She had signed a division order in 1978 that clearly showed her
interest as greater than the interest of her brother. The court of appeals
ruled that the proper award to the plaintiff should have been the amount
of underpaid royalty from September 13, 1982 (three years prior to
filing suit), and judgment was rendered in favor of Sun against the
daughter for the same amount that had been overpaid to her for that
same period.
The court appears to be entirely correct on the inappropriateness
of applying penalties under the Mineral Code. The court also treated
properly the application of the contra non valentem doctrine to the issue
of prescription. One point, however, is troublesome: the decision clearly
reflects that there were division order contracts made in 1978 between
the daughter and the defendant and also between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The royalty paid by defendant to the parties was apparently
in accordance with the division orders. The court did not address the
effects of the division orders. While a division order does not change
the ownership interest under a lease, it does ordinarily protect both
parties to it from claims of overpayment or underpayment when payment
is made in accordance with the interest shown in the division order.
67. See La. R.S. 31:140 (1975).
68. See La. Civ. Code art. 3494 (1984).
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The effect of the division orders here is simply not discussed at all by
the court.
TORT CLAIMS
Liability of Mineral Lessee for Crop Damages to Landowners
Where a landowner did not lease land to a tenant farmer until after
an oil and gas lease had terminated, and damage had already accrued
to land by actions of the oil and gas lessee, the plaintiff-landowners
had a cause of action for damage to their land, even if the lease contained
a stipulation pour autrui in favor of the tenant for damage to his crops.
This was the holding in the case of Freeland v. Crab Run Gas Co. 69
Landowners in this case brought suit against their mineral lessee to
recover for damage to their crops and for the cost of restoration of an
abandoned well site. The defendant claimed that the tenant farmer, not
the plaintiffs, suffered any damages caused by its operations. The trial
court gave judgment for plaintiff landowners, and this was affirmed on
appeal to the third circuit. The appeals court noted that the defendant
had earlier raised an exception of no right of action in the tenant
farmer, which was sustained, and now was asserting that only the tenant
farmer had a cause of action.70 Here, the mineral lease had already
terminated when the tenant and landowner entered an agreement; even
if there were a stipulation pour autrui in favor of the tenant for damage
to his crops, the plaintiffs clearly had a cause of action for damage to
their land.
CONSERVATION CASES: POOLING AND UNITIZATION
Notice of Hearing
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in Kaiser Aluminum
Exploration Co. v. Thompson71 reversed an order of the Commissioner
of Conservation revising units where the applicant did not make a
reasonable effort to notify the owners of interest in the eight units of
the twenty involved in the proceedings. The Louisiana Supreme Court
then reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court holding that
notice had been received. 72
The defendant, Celeron, in Kaiser Aluminum applied to the Com-
missioner of Conservation to dissolve geographic units previously created
and to create revised drilling and production units. The Commissioner
69. 527 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
70. See Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347, 231 So. 2d 347 (1969).
71. 523 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
72. 525 So. 2d 1050 (La. 1988).
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granted the application and issued an order that dissolved twenty existing
geographic units, defined the Upper Tuscaloosa Sand Reservoirs A and
B, and created six geological units for the Upper Tuscaloosa Sand
Reservoir A and one geological unit for the Upper Tuscaloosa Sand
Reservoir B. The plaintiffs owned interests in some of the units that
were dissolved but were not included in the new units. They sought
review of the orders claiming they did not receive adequate notice, that
the order was invalid for failure to give reasons for redefining the sand
and because the redefinition would lead to waste, and that the order
was improperly made effective on July 23, 1985, rather than July 25,
1985. The trial court found that reasonable notice had been given as
some 1,800 interested parties received notice, including many of the
plaintiffs.
On appeal by the plaintiffs, the first circuit reversed. 7 Although
new orders were entered after the trial court decision, the order com-
plained of was in existence for a sixteen month period, and the appeal
was thus not moot. 74 No effort had been made by the applicant to give
notice by mail to the owners of the eight nonproducing units. Four of
the plaintiffs were not given notice and had not received notice. The
applicant failed to comply with the procedural rules of the Commissioner,
and the Commissioner was aware that no effort had been made with
respect to those units. Had the unnotified plaintiffs been given notice,
they might have presented evidence that would have altered the Com-
missioner's findings, thus placing their land within geological units or
maintaining their lands within the geographical units. The order was
issued in violation of statutory provisions and was made upon unlawful
procedure. The court did not take the position that failure to give notice
will generally mean an order is invalid. Rather, the court said the
applicant here did not make a reasonable effort to notify the owners
of interest in the eight units of the twenty involved in the proceedings.
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Louisiana
Court of Appeal and reinstated the trial court decision without issuing
an opinion. The trial court decision was based on a finding that notice
had been received by the plaintiffs though not necessarily properly given.
Thus, the decision of the supreme court apparently stands for no more
than had been held in the case of Brown v. Sutton, 7 which held that
actual notice received by the owner cured the defect in procedure in
giving notice. There the plaintiff, an overriding royalty claimant, was
not sent notice of a unitization proceeding affecting his interest, but he
did learn of it through a report in a newspaper.
73. 523 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 1987).
74. See Kaiser Aluminum Exploration Co. v. Thompson, 512 So. 2d 1197 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1987).
75. 356 So. 2d 965 (La.,1978).
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The Molecular Theory and Partition of Unit Production
The Conservation Law of Louisiana authorizes a special species of
partition for mineral coownership in compulsory units, and the Com-
missioner of Conservation has the authority or jurisdiction, or both, to
exercise this power to effect a partition of gas from a unit well and
provide for balancing where one owner has a contract for sale and
another has no buyer. This was the holding of Amoco Production Co.
v. Thompson.7 6
In this case, Amoco Production Company was the unit operator
for thirteen producing units in the Morganza Field. Amoco had a gas
purchase contract with Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation for
Amoco's share of the gas from the field. Columbia also purchased gas
from other working interest owners in the units but not under contracts.
In 1982 Columbia ceased purchasing gas from others than Amoco in
the units, leaving these others without a purchaser. Amoco applied to
the Commissioner of Conservation for an order allowing it to market
its share of gas from the units separately from the nonoperators. The
then Commissioner 77 granted an order allowing nonoperators who did
not have a balancing agreement to elect to assume full responsibility
for marketing their share of natural gas or to authorize the unit operator
to market their share of gas.7 After entry of this order, certain non-
operators filed for a rehearing before a new Commissioner of Conser-
vation, Herbert Thompson, who rescinded the prior order and issued
an order that required Amoco to deliver to each nonoperator his share
of the proceeds of production in the absence of an agreement to take
in kind. The order also provided that Amoco and the nonoperators
would be deemed to have contracted for Amoco to market gas for the
others.
Amoco filed suit against defendant Thompson seeking rescission of
his order and reinstatement of the order of the prior Commissioner.
The trial court rendered what purported to be an interlocutory judgment
and remanded certain matters to Commissioner Thompson. The Com-
missioner issued an amended order requiring Amoco to account to
nonmarketing owners on the basis of their share of production at the
time of sale (with sale being defined as the time at which the contract
for sale had been entered into); requiring marketing nonoperators to
account to nonmarketing nonoperators on the same basis as Amoco;
76. 516 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 1st 1987), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 118 (1988).
77. The author of this article.
78. The full order of the author with supporting Statement of Reasons for Order is
reprinted as Appendix C to Martin, The Establishment of Allowables for Production of
Gas in Louisiana, 57 Colo. L. Rev. 267, 294-99 (1986), and this article gives the back-
ground to the problem addressed by the order and the reported case.
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deeming that nonoperators had elected to have Amoco market for them
for past production and allowing them to elect whether to take gas in
kind or have Amoco market for them in the future. The trial court
then affirmed this order. Amoco appealed suspensively.
The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First Circuit reversed the
trial court judgment affirming Commissioner Thompson's order, vacated
and set aside the order of Commissioner Thompson, and remanded the
action to the Commissioner for reconsideration in light of the court's
holding. The rule of capture has been modified by the Conservation
Statute under units that are formed by the Commissioner of Conser-
vation. In the establishment of a unit, each owner is entitled to the
opportunity to recover or receive his just and equitable share of pro-
duction. The gas produced from a compulsory unit is initially owned
in indivision. 79 This ownership can be the subject of partition. Partition
in kind is the preferred method of partition provided for in the Con-
servation Law. The Commissioner of Conservation has the authority to
modify or deny the right to take in kind. The Conservation Law au-
thorizes a special species of partition for mineral coownership in com-
pulsory units, and the Commissioner has the authority or jurisdiction,
or both, to exercise this power. Because the Commissioner has the power
to partition the gas in kind, he must have the incidental power to order
balancing; that is, the power to allow the marketing owners at different
times to take one hundred percent of the unit production equal to their
just and equitable share at a given point in time. s0 The Commissioner
79. This is the so-called molecular theory. This theory was announced by the author
in Opinion In Re: Application of Park Lane Enterprises, Incorporated Supplementary to
Order No. 1047, Docket No. 83-260, Irene Field, reprinted as Appendix B to Martin,
supra note 78, at 291-93. This same opinion was the basis for the author's order in the
Morganza Field. In the Irene Field interpretive rule, the author stated:
It follows ineluctably from the working of the order [a typical pooling order]
and the statute [La. R.S. 30:10A(l)(b)] that when gas is produced, it is owned
by each of the owners in the unit in the proportion provided for by the order.
To put it another way, each molecule of gas that is produced is owned by each
owner in the unit in a species of co-ownership. Neither the operator nor any
other owner of production may unilaterally alter this effect of a unit order by
deciding to sell "his" gas while leaving another's gas in the ground. It is not
enough to say that a market was available to another owner or that the gas
would be made available to another owner if he could find a market for "his"
gas. The sole means of avoiding this effect is through the order creating the
unit or supplement thereto.
The court in Amoco v. Thompson adopts this theory of the effect of a unit order.
80. Martin, supra note 78, at 293, Appendix B:
[lit might be observed that should a party so petition, an order could be entered
for a make-up of lost gas out of future production. Objection might be made
to the Commissioner asserting or assuming jurisdiction over marketing issues.
Not only is such concern permissible, it is statutorily mandated. Louisiana
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thus has the authority to order an accounting either in kind or in cash,
depending on the circumstances, as an incident to the obligation of the
Commissioner under the Conservation Law to issue orders affording
each owner the right to recover his just and equitable share. The matter
was remanded to the Commissioner for determination in light of the
authority recognized by this opinion.
The author of this article was the Commissioner of Conservation
who wrote the order rescinded by Commissioner Thompson. The reported
opinion essentially adopts the position taken by the author that the
Commissioner of Conservation does have the power and the duty to
issue orders affording each owner the right to recover his just and
equitable share. Reasonable people can differ about what is required to
afford an owner a reasonable opportunity to recover his just and eq-
uitable share under varied circumstances. The court in the instant opinion
allows the Commissioner the flexibility to address the problems in an
equitable fashion.
Unitization on the Outer Continental Shelf
An order of the Department of the Interior requiring unitization of
two leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) was upheld in Clark
Oil Producing Co. v. Hodel.8' The order was for a conservation purpose,
and the production allocation formula was not arbitrary or capricious.
In 1971, the United States issued two leases on adjoining blocks on
the OCS to Shell Oil and to a group of six companies under Sun Oil
Company, one of which was Clark Oil. After the responsible federal
agency, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), determined that Shell and
Sun were both producing from the same reservoir that underlay the two
leases, the USGS ordered the lessees on the competing leases to unitize
their interests based on its finding that unitization was necessary to
serve best the interest of conservation, to prevent the drilling of un-
necessary wells, to increase ultimate recovery, and to protect correlative
rights. Shell had proposed drilling additional wells to avoid drainage by
the Sun group, and unitization would limit the need to drill additional
wells. The Sun group opposed this.
When the parties could not agree on a unit order, the USGS, in
1975, established a unit agreement order to which the parties would be
Revised Statutes 30:10A(l)(a) requires that each order requiring pooling be on
terms and conditions that will "afford the owner of each tract the opportunity
to recover or receive his just and equitable share of the oil and gas in the pool
without unnecessary expense." Pooling would be meaningless and without effect
if the interests and rights of one owning a portion of the unitized production
could be ignored ...
81. 667 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. La. 1987).
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subject. The order included a production allocation formula based on
two factors: net acre-feet of natural gas-bearing sands underlying each
lease (64%), and the relative production from both leases during a six-
month period (36%). This formula gave Shell 68.140o and Sun 31.86%
of the unit production. The order also required the parties to enter into
a joint operating agreement. Sun signed an agreement under protest.
Sun appealed the determination administratively, requesting and being
granted a stay of the unitization order in the meantime. Shell sought
an award of interest on the production back to the time of the unit
order. The administrative decisions were unfavorable to Sun, and Clark
alone of the Sun group thereupon sought judicial review. Clark sought
to set aside the unit order and decisions of the Interior Department on
three ground: 1) the agency had no authority to unitize the leases; 2)
the allocation formula was arbitrary and capricious; and, 3) Shell was
not entitled to interest. Shell sought to increase an award of interest
from seven to twelve percent. Summary judgment was granted for the
Secretary of the Interior and granted in part for Shell.
82
The effect of this decision was to affirm the unit order and the
award of interest to Shell at seven percent. While the OCSLA was not
amended until 1978 to specifically mention the protection of correlative
rights, the 1975 order did promote conservation by avoiding the drilling
of unnecessary wells. This did not violate tt.e rights of Clark as the
purpose of unitization is to modify the rule of capture. The six month
period of production for establishing a production allocation formula
was a representative period, and the 36% figure used for establishing
the production component of the allocation formula was not arbitrary.
Several points may be noted about the decision in the principal case.
The operative facts of the unitization order arose before the 1978 amend-
ments to the OCSLA that specifically incorporated a reference to pro-
tection of correlative rights in the authorization given the Interior
Department. The court properly held the fact that Shell would have
had to be permitted to drill additional wells to protect itself against
drainage was sufficient to constitute a conservation purpose for the
order. That is, while the order might have protected the correlative
rights of Shell, it also avoided the drilling of unnecessary wells by
making it unnecessary to Shell to drill offset wells.
The court also noted that the avoidance of the drilling of additional
wells would also limit risk to the environment. This is in accord with
a broad definition given the term "natural resources" in the OCSLA
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton.83 In that case the court held that where
82. Id.
83. 493 F.2d 141, 47 Oil & Gas Rep. 455 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Union Oil Co.
v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 51 Oil & Gas Rep. 163 (9th Cir. 1975). Sun Oil Co. v. United
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the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act gave the Secretary of the Interior
authority to provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of
the natural resources of the OCS, the term "natural resources" included
not only oil, gas, sulphur, and other minerals, but also all marine animal
and plant life. Thus, the Secretary in suspending activities on the lease
in question was acting to promote conservation of natural resources and
was acting within the powers delegated to him.
States, 572 F.2d 786 (Ct. Cl. 1978), and Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 591
F.2d 1308, 53 Oil & Gas Rep. 1 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
